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ABSTRACT
There has recently been growing interest in the role of metaphors in envi-
ronmentalism and nature conservation. Metaphors not only structure how
we perceive and think but also how we should act. The metaphor of nature
as a book provokes a different attitude and kind of nature management than
the metaphor of nature as a machine, an organism, or a network. This arti-
cle explores four clusters of metaphors that are frequently used in framing
ecological restoration: metaphors from the domains of engineering and cy-
bernetics; art and aesthetics; medicine and health care; and geography. The
article argues that these metaphors, like all metaphors, are restricted in range
and relevance, and that we should adopt a multiple vision on metaphor. The
adoption and development of such a multiple vision will facilitate commu-
nication and cooperation across the boundaries that separate different kinds
of nature management and groups of experts and other stakeholders.
KEYWORDS
metaphor, environmental engineering, ecological restoration, ecosystem
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Introduction
Since George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980),
metaphors are no longer seen as merely superficial and superfluous
linguistic ornaments, but are considered as indispensable conceptual
tools in thinking, talking, and acting. 
Metaphors perform important cognitive functions, operating as
mechanisms for the translation of something abstract into something
concrete and shedding light on new and unknown phenomena through
familiar ones. In short, metaphors are heuristic devices crucial for cre-
ating and conceptualizing novel ideas and new knowledge. 
However, metaphors are not only important cognitive tools in mak-
ing sense of the world but also important discursive tools that enable
communication and negotiation with others throughout the world.
Metaphors then are also diplomatic devices that facilitate interaction
between different disciplines and discourses (Hellsten 2002).
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Moreover, metaphors also have a clear normative function. They not
only determine our thinking and talking, but also our acting. As Don-
ald Schön has stressed, metaphors enable us—mostly automatically and
unconsciously—to make a “normative leap” from data to recommen-
dations, from facts to values, from “is” to “ought.” Schön (1979) gives the
example of a slum that could either be framed as a “blight” (to be ex-
cised), or as a “natural community” threatened with destruction (call-
ing for enhancement as a vehicle for social learning). Once we have
framed problematic situations in terms of a normative dualism, such as
health/disease or nature/artifice, we know what direction to move in.
Taken together, the cognitive, discursive, and normative functions
of metaphors determine our attitude towards entities in the world. Thus,
for example, people who see nature as a divine text will be more
likely to adopt a passive rather than an active attitude towards nature,
while those who look at nature as a machine might stress our possi-
bilities to control, command, and correct nature.
Once it is acknowledged that the use of metaphor is inescapable
and indispensable, however, we are confronted with the problem of
the sheer multiplicity of metaphors. With respect to nature, Daniel J.
Philippon (2004) has provided us with an extensive, although not ex-
haustive, list of metaphors for nature. Nature can be compared to a
particular place (frontier, garden, park, wilderness, utopia), to a friend
or family member (self, mother, father, sister, brother, wife, husband,
partner), an actor (god or goddess, minister, monarch, lawyer, selective
breeder, enemy), a network (web, community, tapestry), a machine
(clock, engine, computer, spaceship), a state of being (virgin, harmony,
balance), a mode of communication (book), a built object (bank, sink,
storehouse, pharmacy, lifeboat, home), or to a contested landscape (bat-
tlefield, commons) (Philippon 2004: 16; see also Harré et al. 1999).
Confronted with this diversity and heterogeneity of metaphors for
nature, many environmental philosophers and environmental activists
still react with the attempt to reduce this multiplicity and search for
the one best metaphor for nature (Ebenreck 1996; Mills 1982). But re-
cently there is a growing awareness that one simply has to accept the
plurality of metaphors. 
In this article I want to defend this pluralism as a normative value
in itself by examining and comparing the most important metaphors
that are used in framing ecological restoration and explore their cog-
nitive, discursive, and normative possibilities as well as their limits.1 I
will deal successively with metaphors originating from the domains of
engineering and cybernetics, of art and aesthetics, of medicine and
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health care, and of geography. I will then argue that we should not look
for the best metaphor but that we should develop a multiple vision on
metaphors. I will conclude with some preliminary answers to the ques-
tion of how we should conceptualize the relation between the vari-
ous metaphors used in restoring nature. 
Engineering and Cybernetics
Activities to repair environmental damage were initiated by environ-
mental engineering, a discipline that evolved in the early 1970s from
sanitary engineering when various fields such as biochemistry, micro-
biology, fluid mechanics, physical and chemical oceanography, and
meteorology were integrated into traditional courses on drinking water,
wastewater, water quality, and air pollution (McCutcheon and Mitsch
1994). The emerging discipline of environmental engineering had its
own journal, The Journal of Environmental Engineering, published by
the American Society of Civil Engineers. 
By the late 1980s a new discipline appeared on the environmental
scene: ecological engineering. The ecological engineers launched their
own journal in 1992, Ecological Engineering, The Journal of Ecotech-
nology. Ecological engineers or “ecotechnologists” filled niches left
vacant by environmental engineers and gained a foothold especially in
the areas of wetlands creation and ecosystem restoration (McCutcheon
and Walski 1994). Mainly based on the work of Howard Odum, who
was named as honorary editor of Ecological Engineering on the occa-
sion of his 70th birthday, ecological engineering was defined as “the
design of human society with its natural environment for the benefit
of both” (Mitsch 1994). Ecological engineering is an important offshoot
of the New Ecology, a new approach within the field of conservation
biology that can be traced back to cybernetics, which flourished in
the United States in the early post-World War II years in a climate of
technocratic optimism. The politicians, having proved unable to cope
with the problems of a complex industrial society, were urged to
make way for social engineers who would then manage society as a
self-regulating machine. One of these technocrats, Evelyn Hutchin-
son, was to leave an indelible mark on post-war ecology, particularly
through the work of Howard Odum and his brother Eugene (Taylor
1988).
Cybernetics has displayed extraordinary communicative power
because it is compatible with two comprehensive root metaphors that
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have shaped belief systems or “world hypotheses” with a long history
in Western tradition: organicism and mechanism (Pepper 1942). This
compatibility can be clearly observed in the work of Norbert Wiener,
the founder of cybernetics. When he first coined the word “cybernet-
ics” in 1945, he defined it as “control and communication in the animal
and the machine.” Wiener brought together two fields of research. On
the one hand, he elaborated on the engineering-oriented research
into the “servomechanical” nature of control and communication in
machines, using the ideas of information flow, noise, feedback, and
stability. On the other hand, he built on what physiologists like Wal-
ter Canon had developed under the headings of “homeostasis”: a va-
riety of mechanisms in the organism to maintain fixed levels of blood
sugar, blood proteins, fat, and calcium as well as an adequate supply
of oxygen, a constant body temperature, and so on. Whereas Wiener
sought to extend his cybernetic program to social systems, Hutchinson
and his students, Howard and Eugene Odum, applied this program to
ecosystems, stressing their tendency to maintain or restore homeosta-
sis through self-regulating feedback mechanisms.
Because the cybernetic concept of ecosystems is consistent both
with organic and mechanic worldviews, it could fulfill an intermedi-
ary role between ecologists and politicians during the preparatory
years of the International Biological Programme (1963–1968), which
coincided with a general wave in environmental consciousness (Kwa
1987). The concept also appealed to both technocrats and environ-
mentalists. To technocrats, it offered an image of a closed system that
could be controlled and manipulated from a position outside or superior
to the system and so gave rise to an immense technological optimism.
On the other hand, the cybernetic concept allowed environmentalists
to consider and admire ecosystems as large interdependent wholes
that are definitely more than the sum of their parts.
However, from the early 1970s onward, the cybernetic concept of
ecosystems as intermediary started to disintegrate and lose its attractive-
ness for environmentalists. At first glance, the concept’s holism seemed
to counteract the reductionist implications of the mechanistic and ma-
terialistic metaphors of nature that emerged during the scientific revo-
lution of the seventeenth century and that were held responsible for
the decline in community spirit and the alienation from nature (Berg-
son 1907; Merchant 1980; Whitehead 1925). However, on further con-
sideration, environmentalists became convinced that the cybernetic
metaphors seemed to be little more than sophisticated versions of the
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same old mechanistic metaphors (Meisner 1995). In fact, as some have
argued, systems ecology does not proceed in a less reductionist fash-
ion than classic natural sciences, but its reductionism is of a totally
different order. Reductionism in classic natural sciences refers to a re-
duction in elements, such as atoms or molecules, that are identical in
a material sense. Systems ecology, on the other hand, is concerned
with components that are identical in a functional sense because they
perform the same function within the ecosystem, for example, that of
producers, consumers, or decomposers (bacteria and fungi). Such re-
ductionism allows for a trade-off between organisms with a similar
function with the aim of optimising the biomass yield (Keulartz 1998:
149). 
The terminology of “producers,” “consumers,” and “biomass yield”
brings to light another domain of metaphors that is important in shap-
ing the outlook of the New Ecology: modern economy. As Donald
Worster (1977) has shown, exponents of the New Ecology view nature
as a set of resources with cash value; they have transformed nature
into a reflection of the modern corporate state, a chain of factories,
and an assembly line.
The mechanistic and economic metaphors of nature share a pro-
nounced anthropocentric character. Many environmentalists are deeply
concerned about the destructive consequences of such an anthropo-
centrism. Whenever man sets himself up as the measure of all things,
so runs the environmentalist critique of anthropocentrism, nature, in-
cluding human nature, ceases to be an independent and inexhausti-
ble source of value. It becomes instead a mere resource to be disposed
of at will, with all the detrimental consequences for the environment.
If we are to prevent the environmental crisis from ending in catas-
trophe, environmental philosophers agree, we must convert to non-
anthropocentrism, judging life forms on their intrinsic value and not
on their instrumental value. 
Following the famous philosopher Martin Heidegger, many envi-
ronmentalists are convinced that we should no longer approach na-
ture in terms of its utility and availability to our insatiable will to
power but instead adopt an attitude of responsiveness and “release-
ment” (Gelassenheit). Man should learn to behave more like a shep-
herd than as a lord of being. We will get nearer to such an attitude if
we turn to another source of metaphors, the field of art and aesthet-
ics, which has inspired the theory and practice of ecological restora-
tion, at least in its formative stages.
USING METAPHORS IN RESTORING NATURE
31

Art and Aesthetics
In 1981 William R. Jordan III, who coined the term “ecological resto-
ration,” founded the oldest journal that deals exclusively with the sub-
ject of restoring ecosystems, first as Restoration & Management Notes
and from 1999 as Ecological Restoration. Jordan is also a founding
member of the Society for Ecological Restoration International (SER)
that was established in 1988. In 1993 SER published the first issue of
its flagship journal, Restoration Ecology.
Ecological restoration is considered an intentional activity that ini-
tiates or accelerates the return of an ecosystem to its historical origin.
Ecological restoration differs from ecological engineering with respect
to the predictability of outcomes. “Predictability is a primary consid-
eration in all engineering design, whereas restoration recognizes and
accepts unpredictable development and addresses goals that reach
beyond strict pragmatism and encompass biodiversity and ecosystem
integrity and health” (Society for Ecological Restoration Science and
Policy Working Group 2004: 12).
Because restoration attempts to return an ecosystem to its historic
trajectory, historic conditions are the ideal starting point for restoration
design. Although it may be difficult or impossible to determine the his-
toric trajectory of a severely impacted ecosystem with accuracy, the
general direction and boundaries of that trajectory can, nevertheless,
be established through knowledge of the damaged ecosystem’s pre-
existing structure, composition and functioning (palaeo-references), and
through studies on comparable intact ecosystems elsewhere (actuo-
references).
From the outset, ecological restoration’s attempt to return degraded
ecosystems to their original state has been interpreted in terms of the
restoration of artworks. This metaphor was put forward by environ-
mental philosophers in particular (Gobster and Hull 2000; Throop
2000). At first, the comparison of nature to art was made in order to dis-
credit ecological restoration. In his famous 1982 paper Faking Nature,
Australian philosopher Robert Elliot argued that ecological restoration
is akin to art forgery. Just as a reproduction or a replicate cannot repro-
duce the value of an original artwork, restored nature cannot reproduce
the value of original nature. “What the environmental engineers are
proposing is that we accept a fake or forgery instead of the real thing”
(Eliot 2003: 383). A Van Meegeren will, of course, always be inferior
to a real Vermeer! 
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In his 1992 paper “The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature,”
environmental philosopher Eric Katz further argued that whatever is
produced in a restored landscape certainly cannot count as having
the original value of nature, particularly wild nature, and that restored
nature necessarily represents a form of disvalue and domination of
nature. “Once we dominate nature, once we restore and redesign na-
ture for our own purposes, then we have destroyed nature—we have
created an artifactual reality, in a sense, a false reality, which merely
provides us the pleasant illusory appearance of the natural environ-
ment” (Katz 2003: 396).
Other environmental philosophers are less harsh in their judge-
ment of restored nature. Andrew Light (2003), for instance, thinks that
Eliot’s and Katz’s criticisms are only valid with respect to a particularly
malicious kind of restoration—restoration that is used to justify the
disturbance or destruction of nature, for instance for the benefit of some
industrial activity, with the argument that it is possible nowadays to
create a piece of nature with the same value as the original at a later
date or at a different place. But, Light insists, this kind of restoration
is relatively rare. Most restoration efforts are undertaken to correct a
past harm. In these cases, ecological restoration is more akin to art res-
toration than to art reproduction or art forgery. 
However, this metaphor is not entirely unproblematic because the
very idea of restoration of artworks is itself controversial, as Light points
out with reference to the early aesthetic theory of Mark Sagoff. In 1978,
before he ever turned to environmental questions, Sagoff published
an article, “On Restoring and Reproducing Art,” in which he argued
that not just any art restoration should count as a legitimate restora-
tion. Here, Sagoff draws a distinction between integral and purist art
restorations. An integral restoration puts new pieces in the place of
original fragments that have been lost. The point of integral restoration
is to make the whole work look original. Sagoff rejects this kind of
restoration as both aesthetically and ethically troublesome, and he is
obviously in favor of purist restorations. “A purist restoration limits it-
self to cleaning works of art and to reattaching original pieces that
may have fallen. Purists contend that nothing inauthentic—nothing
not produced by the original artist—may be shown” (Sagoff 1978: 457).
A purist restoration allows viewers to imagine a work of art as com-
plete, yet, at the same time, to see what is authentic and what is not,
whereas an integral restoration only succeeds if viewers cannot tell the
difference between the original and the restored work. Integral restora-
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tions not only diminish or even destroy the original value of an art-
work, purists argue, they also deceive the public.
Following Sagoff, Light claims that any integral restoration of na-
ture, even if it is benevolent, cannot have the same value as original
nature. He seems to be somewhat less rigorous than Sagoff, however,
in assuming that one can distinguish between different kinds of inte-
gral ecological restorations as better or worse. But, more importantly,
Light claims that many ecological restorations amount to something
more akin to purist than to integral restorations. Light mentions clean-
ups as the most obvious cases of purist restoration. Clean-ups include
the bio-activation of existing micro-organisms in soils to allow the land
to essentially clean itself up, and cleaning out exotic plants that were
introduced at some time into a site, allowing the native plants to re-
establish themselves.
However, the purist view on ecological restoration is more prob-
lematic than Light seems willing to acknowledge. Purists respect a
work of art as the result of a particular process, as the creation of a par-
ticular artist working at a certain place and time, and not merely as a
bearer of aesthetic properties. Here, however, the art-nature analogy
may ultimately break down. Even if we would allow the existence of
a master craftsman to whom we may attribute the authorship of na-
ture, his or her products can never be traced back to a particular place
and time. Among ecologists and conservationists there is an ongoing
discussion about the question of which historical reference one should
choose. Should one go back to the last interglacial era when human-
kind did not even yet have projectile weapons such as the bow and
arrow and therefore was not yet capable of submitting his natural en-
emies? Should one go back to the time before the emergence of agri-
culture, or should one only have to go back to pre-industrial times and
resort to traditional agrarian techniques such as reed and brushwood
cultivation, tree planting and felling, and mowing and turf cutting?
The answer to this question depends on how one considers the re-
lationship between humans and nature. This relationship can only be
compared, in a severely limited way, to our aesthetic attitude towards
works of art. This attitude is one of sympathetic contemplation of an
object for its own sake. According to the eighteenth-century philoso-
pher Immanuel Kant, works of art possess a certain “Zweckmässigkeit
ohne Zweck” (purposiveness without a purpose). He describes the way
we experience their beauty as “interesseloses Wohlgefallen” (disinter-
ested pleasure). However, nature is never solely the object of experi-
ences of beauty or the sublime but has many other functions. Water,
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for instance, is important to traffic, transportation, food supply, irriga-
tion, recreation, and domestic use.
Another major difference between art and nature, as Rolston (2000)
has argued, is that works of art are entirely passive and, left to them-
selves, decay inevitably. We restore them; they do not restore them-
selves. In contrast, left to itself nature flourishes and can restore itself.
However, this argument is only valid as long as we stay focused on the
visual arts. If we turn to performing arts like theatre, dance, or music,
the restoration metaphor acquires a different meaning. A ballet, sym-
phony, or play is anything but static; it derives its very life from being
recreated time and again. Such an artwork obtains its identity only
through the multitude of its successive performances. The equation of
ecological restorations with artistic performances was made by Jordan
in numerous writings (e.g., Jordan 1987). He denounces “environmen-
talism’s blindness to the performative or expressive aspect of restora-
tion—to what might be called its ritual value” (Jordan 2000: 215). 
Moreover, the performing arts cannot thrive without an audience.
Because artistic performances are public rituals, this version of the art
restoration metaphor is akin to the community metaphor, which has
a long tradition in ecology, especially in the land ethic of Aldo Leo-
pold. According to Leopold’s famous statement, “a land ethic changes
the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to
plain member and citizen of it” (Leopold 1949: 240). Restorationists
who have adopted the community metaphor perceive themselves as
participants rather than as curators of museum pieces. Participation is
supposed to strengthen the ties between humans and between the hu-
man community and the larger ecological community.
The analogy between ecological restoration and artistic recre-
ation does more justice to the dynamic interplay of nature and culture
that follows from our multifunctional use of natural resources than
does the analogy between ecological restoration and the restoration
of parts or pieces of a museum collection. In this respect, the meta-
phors of artistic recreation have some resemblance to metaphors from
the domain of engineering and cybernetics—metaphors that are also
human-inclusive rather than human-exclusive. They differ, however,
with respect to the standard by which ecological restorations should
be evaluated. In the first case, “authenticity” functions as a yardstick.
An artistic performance should be true to the original score, script, or
scenario. Although the players, the props, the scenery, and costumes
constantly change, the performance has to remain Swan Lake. Unlike
the above, metaphors from the domain of engineering and cybernet-
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ics are not about originality or authenticity but rather about “function-
ality.” In this regard, these metaphors have more in common with a
cluster of metaphors that have more recently emerged from the do-
main of medicine and health care.
Medicine and Health Care
Since about 1990, the notion of “health” has made an amazing career
within environmentalism and ecology. Its domain of application has
been extended from the level of the individual (clinical and veterinary
medicine) and the population (epidemiology and public health) to the
level of ecosystems. An interdisciplinary field of research has devel-
oped in which the relations between human activities, social organi-
zations, natural systems, and health are being systematically explored.
At present, the notion of health is a focal point for the integration of
three highly overlapping areas of research activity: ecosystem medi-
cine, geographical medicine, and conservation medicine.
“Ecosystem medicine” emerged in the early 1990s and gained mo-
mentum in 1994 with the establishment of the International Society
for Ecosystem Health (ISEH). Since 1995, the ISEH has published the
journal Ecosystem Health. The society is dedicated to the idea that a
healthy ecosystem is one that provides services supportive of the human
community, such as food, potable water, clean air, and the capacity for
assimilating and recycling wastes. Ecosystem medicine aims at devel-
oping “a systemic approach to the preventive, diagnostic, and prognos-
tic aspects of ecosystem management, and … [at] understanding …
[the] relationships between ecosystem health and human health” (Rap-
port et al. 1999: 84). This approach is not entirely new. Aldo Leopold
already refers to “the art of land doctoring” and “the science of land
health.” 
Ecosystems are regarded as healthy as long as they have the ca-
pacity to maintain structure and function in the face of stress. Propo-
nents of this approach talk about the “Ecosystem Distress Syndrome”
(EDS). Some indicators of this syndrome are changes in primary pro-
ductivity and in nutrient cycling, loss of species diversity, and return
to early stages of succession.
The second area of research activity that uses a broad concept of
health is “geographical medicine” or “geomedicine.” Geographical
medicine is a subdiscipline of epidemiology that studies the impact 
of the environment on the geographical distribution of health and ill-
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ness. There has recently been a growing concern about the influence
on the health of human populations of global economic, technological,
and environmental changes, including climate change, ozone deple-
tion, loss of biodiversity, land degradation, desertification, deforesta-
tion, worldwide urbanization, and mass migration due to war or natural
disasters. From 2000 to 2004, the journal Global Change and Human
Health provided a platform for scientific research into the health im-
pacts of these globalization processes (Martens et al. 2000).
The last area of research focusing on a broad health concept is
called “conservation medicine.” This new discipline combines tech-
niques, facts, and concepts from public health, veterinary medicine,
conservation biology, and plant pathology. Conservation medicine
evolved out of a crisis: unprecedented levels of disease in many species
as a result of the worldwide transformations of the host-parasite rela-
tions by climate change, chemical pollution, animal trade, encroach-
ment into wildlife areas, and habitat fragmentation.
With the launch of the first issue of the journal EcoHealth in Jan-
uary 2004, the collaboration between these three areas of research
activity took a more definite shape. This journal aims to build on the
legacy of both Ecosystem Health and Global Change and Human Health
and also intends to cover the area of conservation medicine that has
not yet been represented by a scholarly journal.
In contrast to the art restoration metaphor, the health metaphor
implies a “humans in” approach to ecosystem analysis and assessment.
Consequently, the health metaphor is also less negative about technol-
ogy than the art restoration metaphor: health does not depend on some
original or authentic condition because people can feel healthy and
function normally with a hearing aid, bypass, or artificial kidney. Given
these differences, “rehabilitation” seems to provide a far more appropri-
ate term for the health-centred approach than “restoration.” Exponents
of the “rehabilitation” approach share its human-inclusive and function-
alist perspective with environmental engineers and ecotechnologists. 
The health metaphor is an extremely powerful discursive tool. It is
broad enough to encompass a variety of scientific approaches and, like
the cybernetic concept of ecosystems, is compatible with mechanic and
organic worldviews. It not only facilitates the cooperation between
natural, social, and medical scientists but also has an important commu-
nicative function for the general public as well. It provides a vocabu-
lary of symptoms, syndromes, diagnostic indicators, and so on with
which laypeople are already familiar as potential or actual patients and
consumers of health care services (Rapport et al. 1998). Over the last
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few years, the health metaphor has gained ground in ecological resto-
ration. As Harris and Hobbs have noticed, the two emergent fields of
ecosystem health and ecological restoration have the potential to com-
plement one another comfortably: “If we view the concept of ecosys-
tem health as the diagnostic toolbox and ecological restoration as the
treatment toolbox for the management of damaged ecosystems, there is
clearly the potential for useful synergy” (Harris and Hobbs 2001: 200).
The incorporation of the health metaphor into restoration ecology
has recently provoked criticism from Mark Davis and Lawrence Slo-
bodkin. They reject the idea that communities and ecosystems possess
traits such as “health” and “integrity” because this idea is reminiscent
of outdated ecological ideas of communities and ecosystems as inte-
grated entities, like Clements’s concept of plant communities as super-
organisms. They argue that “attributes such as ‘health’ and ‘integrity’
can [only] be meaningfully applied to entities that have been directly
shaped by evolution, such as individual organisms … However, com-
munities and ecosystems are not shaped as entities by evolution”
(Davis and Slobodkin 2004: 1).
Davis and Slobodkin’s argument is problematic because it does not
appreciate that the use of metaphors is inevitable and, what is more,
that metaphors fulfill indispensable cognitive functions. It is precisely
the very inability to provide a “literal” transcription of a metaphor in
a scientific theory that constitutes its heuristic power. The other side of
the coin is, of course, that metaphors can only claim a limited validity.
The potential advantages of the health metaphor should not seduce us
to embrace it as the one and only truth. Like all metaphors, the health
metaphor also falls short in some respects. Ecosystems will not, for ex-
ample, visit a doctor with their complaints. They cannot announce that
they are sick and then tell when they are feeling better. Moreover, in
the case of ecosystems, there is more possibility of a conflict between
the health of the whole and the health of the components than in the
case of human organisms. (Hammond and Holland 1995: 285). 
Geography
In his 2004 book Conserving Words, Daniel Philippon explores how
the American environmental movement has been shaped by the seminal
works of five famous nature writers. Each of these writers understood
“nature” through a particular metaphor that enabled certain narratives
that explained how human beings should interact with nature: fron-
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tier (Theodore Roosevelt), garden (Mabel Osgood Wright), park (John
Muir), wilderness (Aldo Leopold), and utopia (Edward Abbey). Philip-
pon calls these metaphors geographical metaphors because each 
of them refers to nature in terms of a particular place. He concludes
his book with a discussion of what he considers to be the latest and
most promising geographic metaphor: the metaphor of nature as an
island. In fact, the island metaphor goes back to the New Ecology and
to the work of Evelyn Hutchinson, in particular. In a pioneering article
published in 1946, “Circular Causal Systems in Ecology,” Hutchinson
distinguishes two closely related approaches: the “biogeochemical”
and the “biodemographic” approach. 
Seen from a biogeochemical perspective, the entire biosphere ap-
pears as a giant cyclical system of energy, matter, and information that
is able to maintain a dynamic equilibrium thanks to a series of feed-
back mechanisms. This perspective was elaborated on, in particular, by
Hutchinson’s student Howard Odum and his brother Eugene (see the
first section on “Engineering and Cybernetics”). 
The biodemographic approach, on the other hand, deals with
groups or communities of organisms, the so-called populations. In
conformity with the cybernetic principle shared by both approaches,
these populations are also perceived as systems attempting to main-
tain their stability under ever-changing conditions by means of feed-
back mechanisms. This approach was further elaborated on by Robert
MacArthur, another of Hutchinson’s students. In the 1960s, Mac-
Arthur, in collaboration with Edward Wilson, developed the “island
theory,” a theory on the biogeography of islands. The theory predicts
the number of species on a given island, using the size of the island
and the distance to the mainland as its main parameters. MacArthur
and Wilson also assumed a dynamic equilibrium: although the taxo-
nomic composition on the island is subject to continuous change, the
number of species, which is determined by the rates of extinction and
colonization, remains constant. Their 1967 book The Theory of Island
Biogeography is one of the most frequently cited books in ecology
and popular biology.
Although MacArthur and Wilson’s theory and Odum’s systems
theory come from the same theoretical background, they differ widely
in their rhetorical potential. Whereas the metaphor of nature as clock-
work reinforces our confidence in our ability to repair damaged
ecosystems like we repair “the radio or the family car,” as Hutchinson
once put it (Kwa 1987: 427), the metaphor of nature as an island re-
minds us that there are “limits to growth” and that nature cannot be
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endlessly exploited. It calls attention to the ongoing fragmentation
and ecological isolation by the encroachment of civilization and all
the risks of extinction that come with it.
As Philippon has noted, the island metaphor is intimately related
to another metaphor, the network metaphor, which connotes connec-
tivity through, for example, corridors, ecoducts, stepping stones, and
coastal linkages. “Islands provide a means to discuss webs and net-
works and systems of influence” (Philippon 2004: 270).
While Odum’s systems theory was very popular in the 1960s and
1970s, the island theory has had a lightning career from the early
1980s onward, especially within European nature policy. It has been
used to underpin the network-notion, in the (metaphorical) sense that
nature areas should be perceived as “islands in a sea of cultivated land.”
The theory also serves as a basis for the attempt to maximize the size
of contiguous nature areas and the number of links between them.
The concept of a comprehensive network of nature areas was in-
troduced in Europe with the 1992 directive on the conservation of
natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (the Habitats Directive).
Together with the 1979 Birds Directive, the Habitats Directive consti-
tutes the instrument for creating a European ecological network, the
so-called Natura 2000, which is considered to be the cornerstone for
the protection of biodiversity in Europe. Currently, the network con-
cept is rapidly gaining more importance due to the growing need for
migration of many species struggling to escape extinction as a result
of climate change and of global change in general.2
Although the network metaphor is no more true or accurate than
any of the other metaphors, it may well turn out to be more useful as a
communicative device in scientific discourse, public debate, and po-
litical decision making about restoring nature. The network metaphor
does not only connect areas, populations, and habitats, but it also en-
courages the creation and establishment of linkages between people,
disciplines, and practices. It also enables communication and cooper-
ation between environmentalists and ecologists over the whole resto-
ration spectrum, from the islands and fragments of biodiversity and the
corridors between them to the buffer zones and the wider surroundings.
Toward a Multiple Vision
As we have seen in the previous sections, every metaphor is restricted
in range and relevance. Metaphors are like searchlights that highlight
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certain features while blocking out others. According to Lakoff and
Johnson (1980: 165), each metaphor is true for certain purposes, in cer-
tain respects, and in certain contexts. As Sara Ebenreck has written,
“Rather than proceed as if any one metaphor is the finally correct meta-
phor, ethicists conscious of the constructive imagination at work in
these basic metaphors might be more aware of the limits of any meta-
phorical construction and more open to the experiences and values
embodied in alternate metaphoric constructions of the Earth” (1996: 14).
Moreover, the search for the one best metaphor is not without pitfalls
and can lead to what Mark Meisner (1995: 14) has called “a sort of per-
ceptual hegemony.” This is the case if a metaphor ceases to be perceived
as metaphor and is taken literally, so that we are no longer able to recog-
nize that it represents but a singular perspective (see Slobodkin 2001).
In order to prevent such one-sidedness, we should adopt what
Donald Schön and Martin Rein used to call a “double vision”: “the
ability to act from a frame while cultivating awareness of alternative
frames” (Schön and Rein 1994: 207). We should learn to “squint,” so to
speak, in order to see things from different angles simultaneously, or
we should develop what philosopher of technology Don Idhe (1993)
has called a “compound eye.”
Fostering a double—or multiple—vision is a necessary condition
to solve conflicts that arise because opponents frame the problem at
hand differently. However, often this kind of “frame reflection” will
not be sufficient but also requires what Schön (1979) calls “frame re-
structuring.” Hereby “we respond to frame conflict by constructing a
new problem-setting story, one in which we attempt to integrate con-
flicting frames by including features and relations drawn from earlier
stories” (Schön 1979: 270).
The ideal of pluralism, underlying the idea of a multiple vision on
metaphor, should be distinguished from sheer relativism. Questions of
judgment cannot be suspended, unless we assume that all metaphors
are equally valid. How can this “relativist trap” be avoided? Is it pos-
sible to find criteria that allow us to distinguish better metaphors from
lesser ones? This question is central to the controversy over the use of
metaphors in invasion biology. Recently, the way non-native species
have been conceptualized as “exotic,” “alien,” and “invaders” to be
eradicated and exterminated has been criticized as overly militaristic,
nationalist, and xenophobic. (Chew and Laubichler 2003; Gobster
2005; Larson 2005; O’Brien 2006; Simberloff 2003). I have discussed
the implications of bellicose metaphors in ecology and nature conser-
vation in another article (Keulartz and Van der Weele 2007 submitted).
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In this article, I want to answer the question of what the outcome
would be of employing a multiple vision on ecological restoration.
Given the similarities and differences between metaphors from cyber-
netics, aesthetics, medicine, and geography, how should we judge the
value and meaning of these metaphors? And how do they relate to
one another?
Environmental philosopher Baird Callicott and his colleagues Larry
Crowder and Karen Mumford have provided us with an interesting
possibility to arrange the most important metaphors used in restoring
nature (Callicott et al. 1999). They distinguish two contemporary schools
of conservation philosophy: “compositionalism” and “functionalism.”
According to Callicott and colleagues, the compositionalist emphasis
is on the process of returning a biotic community to its original con-
dition of biological diversity and integrity; whereas the functionalist
emphasis is more on the process of returning an ecosystem to a state of
health. Callicott and colleagues consider compositionalism and func-
tionalism as two ends of a continuum: the compositionalist emphasis
on the ecological restoration of biological integrity and diversity is ap-
propriate for the management of the less severely degraded areas such
as wilderness areas, national parks, and state parks. The functionalist
emphasis on the ecological rehabilitation of ecosystem health is more
suited for the much greater part of the world that is inhabited and eco-
nomically exploited by humans. 
Using the island metaphor, Callicott cum suis argue that the com-
positionalist and functionalist approaches have a complementary and
dialectical relationship. “The preservation of islands of biological di-
versity and integrity and ecological restoration necessarily occurs at
present in a humanly inhabited and economically exploited matrix.
Hence the success of nature preservation and restoration necessarily
depends on ecologically rehabilitating and maintaining the health of
these matrices. On the other hand the maintenance of ecosystem
health in humanly inhabited and economically exploited areas depends
upon the existence of reservoirs of biological diversity and integrity”
(Callicott et al. 1999: 32). 
With the notion of a spectrum of conservation philosophies and
nature management styles between the poles of less and more severely
degraded areas, the above quote suggests an answer to our question
with respect to a multiple vision on ecological restoration. This notion
should, however, be expanded to include environmental engineering
and ecological engineering (or ecotechnology) as well. After all, meta-
phors from the domain of engineering and cybernetics share a marked
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functionalism with metaphors from the domain of medicine and health
care, in apparent contrast to metaphors from the field of art and aes-
thetics, which have an obvious compositionalist emphasis (Figure 1).3
Note that the way the domain of geography is presented differs
from the way the other domains are represented in the figure. This is
because the island metaphor (and the associated network metaphor)
is underlying the continuum of Callicott cum suis. We will come back
to this aspect of the figure in our discussion.
Discussion
The notion of a spectrum ranging from less to most severely degraded
areas can be useful in addressing potential problems of communication,
coordination, and cooperation between various scientific (sub)disci-
plines, management practices, and the general public. On the other
hand, this notion is also problematic because in many cases there is sim-
ply no agreement on what should count as degraded or not. Take the
Chicago Restoration Controversy, which broke out as soon as plans to
clear forestland to create prairies and open woodlands were made pub-
lic. The restoration stewards, who considered the actual landscape as
“degraded” and “overgrown,” invited their critics to visit some of their
preserves in the hope of winning them over. However, this was unsuc-
cessful. Whereas the restoration stewards valued the recently burned
woodlands as beautiful sites, “finally opened up so that the native un-
derstory could return,” the critics saw the scorched woodlands as “virtu-
ally wastelands where the soil is sterile and nothing but charred stumps
remain.” For one group it was an exciting and promising site; for the
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Figure 1  Sources of Metaphors on a Scale from Most to Less 
Degraded Areas
other it was a sad and scary portent of the future of the land (Helford
2000: 130). 
One possible explanation for the intractability of the Chicago
Restoration Controversy is the use of metaphors of invasion and war
by the restoration volunteers. On the one hand, the martial view of
restoration work had a positive effect on reinforcing the volunteers’
commitment and willingness to sacrifice for their case. On the other
hand, this view may have intensified the controversy. For volunteers
who saw themselves as combatants in a war to save nature, it was easy
to view their opponents as enemies of nature. “The immediate impulse
was to fight and try to defeat these enemies, rather than to try to un-
derstand their objections and look for ways to negotiate and compro-
mise” (Schroeder 2000: 262).
It is clear from this and many other controversies that what peo-
ple consider as degraded areas depends on their perceptions of nature
and, in particular, on the metaphors they use to express their attitude
towards nature. As we saw in the previous section, Callicott and col-
leagues also specify their notion of degradation with the help of a
metaphor, namely, the metaphor of nature areas as islands that are in
increasing danger of being engulfed by the sea of cultivated land. It is
exactly because the island metaphor is underlying the continuum of
Callicott cum suis that the domain of geography is represented differ-
ently than from the other metaphors in Figure 1.
At this point we run the risk of going in a circle: the plausibility
of the classification of metaphors according to the kind of site (more
or less severely degraded) seems to depend on the plausibility of yet
another metaphor. This suggests that it is impossible to break out of
the circle of metaphors and to find criteria to evaluate metaphors out-
side or beyond this circle. But—and this is the first step to a solution
of the problem—this circle should not be seen as a vicious circle that
one should try to break out of, but should instead be considered a
hermeneutic circle of part and whole, of text and context, that we
should try to enter in the right way.
The force of metaphors depends on the whole system or “ecology”
of metaphors that together constitute the cultural context, the cultural
climate in a particular era. Whether metaphors can acquire significant
cognitive, discursive, or normative power is determined by the degree
to which they resonate with social values and visions that are dominant
in a certain period. As we have seen at some length in section 4, the
island metaphor and the adjacent network metaphor currently seem to
have the best credentials among professionals and within the larger pub-
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lic as well. Given this “working consensus,” I think that my proposal to
arrange the different metaphors based on Callicott’s notion of a spectrum
from less to most severely degraded areas seems sufficiently justified. 
Of course, this proposal cannot claim absolute validity but is context-
specific and relative with respect to time, place, and circumstance. We
should stay aware of our hermeneutic situation, but, on the other hand,
we should also proceed pragmatically and prevent reflexivity from de-
generating into hyper-reflexivity. As Ludwig Wittgenstein so eloquently
argued in his collection On Certainty, “We just can’t investigate every-
thing, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assump-
tion. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put” (Wittgenstein
1969–1975: proposition 343).4
Conclusion
In this article the most common metaphors for framing ecological resto-
ration have been explored in some detail. Acknowledging the fact that
every metaphor inescapably falls short in some respect, the article 
argues that the search for the one best metaphor is a dead end and
claims that we should develop a multiple vision instead. An attempt has
been made to create some order out of the chaos of different and often
diverging metaphors. The proposal to arrange these metaphors accord-
ing to a scale from less to most severely degraded areas, however incom-
plete or imperfect, could help improve communication and cooperation
across the borders between people from different disciplines, between
practitioners and theoreticians, and between experts and laypeople.
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Notes
1. This list was obtained by examining the most relevant journals and some key
publications. Note that “ecological restoration” is broadly defined because it is still a
highly dynamic field and shows considerable overlap with other disciplines.
2. We may credit the Greenway Movement in the United States with having an-
ticipated the idea of thinking in terms of green networks (Fabos and Ryan 2006). The
movement started off in the mid 1860s when Frederick Law Olmsted and his col-
leagues began designing park systems in and around cities. These systems were com-
posed of urban parks connected by parkways. After fading from public consciousness
during the second third of the previous century, the greenway concept enjoyed a pop-
ular revival in the early 1970s, with clear recognition of the ecological importance of
the green connections and environmental corridors. 
3. To prevent any misunderstandings, it should be stressed that the idea of a con-
tinuum is conflicting with the notion of clear-cut borderlines between the various ar-
eas and is only compatible with gradual differences, allowing for all kinds of mixed
territories, and, by implication, by all sorts of combinations of models and metaphors.
4. What should be considered a hinge depends on the problem under investiga-
tion. It can be argued that the very idea of restoration ecology can be used as a hinge
for ecological studies. William R. Jordan III takes this view when he regards the abil-
ity to reassemble a community or ecosystem and to make it function properly as a crit-
ical test of ecological understanding in the most fundamental sense (see e.g. Jordan et
al. 1987: 6).
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